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INTRODUCTION 
Although Max Scheler (1874-1928) was seen by many of his contemporaries as one of the 
most important intellectual forces in European philosophy, the interest in Scheler‟s thought 
rapidly decreased soon after his death. In general, Scheler‟s philosophy has received little 
attention, at least not the attention one would think worthy of a major intellectual force in 
philosophy. One could refer here to Hans-Georg Gadamer, who, rather sharply, expressed his 
discontentment with the lack of recognition Scheler's writings receive, even in Germany. “It is 
almost unbelievable, but when you nowadays ask a young man about it, or even an older one, 
who is interested in philosophy, he hardly knows who Scheler was.”1 
Scheler‟s later works (1922-1928) especially have been sadly misunderstood and 
underestimated. In these writings Scheler abandoned Catholicism and developed a 
panentheistic world view with an utterly original concept of God (Gottwerdung) which is 
hardly compatible with Catholicism. As far as I am concerned, most attempts to explain this 
metaphysical swing in Scheler's thought and to grasp its essence and significance, seem to 
have been rather unsuccessful. This can partly be ascribed to the fact that most readers and 
critics of Scheler were immensely disappointed that Scheler broke with the Catholic Church. 
For about a decade, Scheler had been the most important German Catholic philosopher. His 
influence and intellectual authority were such that many people converted to Catholicism after 
reading his writings.
2
 
 
One can understand how disappointed many were in Scheler‟s “metaphysical swing” towards 
panentheism, and the emotional reactions it provoked severely hindered any objective 
analysis of Scheler's Späte Schriften (Late Writings). They were immediately dismissed as 
inferior to anything he had written before and the reasons for this alleged qualitative decline 
in Scheler's thought were solely sought in Scheler's private life. Jan Nota for example, one of 
the experts on Scheler, described Scheler‟s ideas of this period as cold and methodologically 
unsatisfactory in comparison with his earlier works, and like many critics, argued that 
Scheler‟s turbulent private life and “sexual activities” (Scheler wanted a divorce from his 
second wife, while the divorce from his first wife had already caused a huge scandal) were to 
be held responsible for this. This was the communis opinio of most readers of Scheler‟s 
writings, as is illustrated in Louis De Raeymaeker‟s comments on Scheler‟s abandonment of 
Catholicism, saying  Scheler had done so “not because of reasons of a philosophical kind [but 
that Scheler] felt obliged to adapt his system to his loose life.”3 
 
Furthermore, it has always been bon ton to describe Scheler as an inconsistent, rather 
impulsive thinker, who changed his views from one day to the next. His drastic parting from 
Catholicism was therefore dismissed as an impulse. Dietrich von Hildebrand, Howard Becker, 
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and many others have all attributed Scheler‟s metaphysical change to “some inadequacy of 
the man himself.”4  
 
In any case, it was generally assumed that Scheler did not have good reasons for his 
metaphysical swing, and that his reasons were not of a philosophical kind. This negative 
evaluation of Scheler's Späte Schriften is not only characteristic of Scheler‟s Christian 
contemporaries and critics. Martin Buber critically commented upon Scheler‟s metaphysical 
swing as “one of the countless gnostic attempts to strip the mystery from the biblical God,”5 
and some of the most important contemporary connoisseurs of Scheler's philosophy have 
criticized these writings in a remarkably sharp way, albeit that their rejection of Scheler‟s late 
metaphysics had nothing to do with any moralizing judgments about Scheler‟s private life. 
Eugene Kelly, for example, wrote in his praiseworthy Structure and Diversity that he has 
“never forgiven Scheler for this late turn to metaphysics,”6 even characterizing this late turn 
as “ultimately misbegotten.”7  
 
I will argue in this article that Scheler‟s last writings are certainly not necessarily less valuable 
than his earlier works. First, I will try to prove that Scheler‟s Späte Schriften are in 
remarkable concordance with his earlier writings, at least from the perspective of his ethical 
views and system, and certainly do not represent such a dramatic rupture as is often put forth 
by those who have never been able “to forgive” him for his metaphysical swing. The main 
part of this article will therefore consist of an analysis of the moral implications that are 
inherent in Scheler‟s renewing concept of God, as it is obvious that Scheler‟s concept of 
Gottwerdung, central in his late metaphysics, does not leave morality untouched. I will stress 
the fact that these moral implications remarkably coincide with the core of Scheler‟s earlier 
ethical system, as developed in his magnificent Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die 
Materiale Wertethik (Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values). Furthermore, 
Scheler's Späte Schriften are not only compatible with the essence of his earlier ethics, but 
there is also a great consistency in them, even though they are often characterized as merely a 
collection of distinct essays. Scheler‟s so-called metanthropology accords with his political, 
epistemological and ethical views. It is beyond doubt that the recognition of this internal and 
overall consistency of Scheler‟s writings leads to a better comprehension and fuller 
appreciation of Scheler‟s latest creative period.  
 
Secondly, and more generally, I will try to explain why Scheler changed his metaphysical 
views. As I have already indicated, some say this is due to his turbulent private life and sexual 
activities. It has been said that Scheler‟s new metaphysical conception in fact mirrors 
Scheler‟s own powerlessness in the face of his own sexual urges. I find this criticism rather 
disrespectful. It does not explain Scheler‟s swing. Nor does the alleged 'innate philosophical 
inconsistency' of Scheler explain his profound change of thought. 
 
GOD AND MORALITY: From Ethics to Metaphysics 
a) An anthropocentric concept of God 
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Before I can advance to an analysis of how Scheler‟s new metaphysical position related to his 
earlier writings, I will briefly outline the essence of this new position, which Scheler 
elaborated above all in Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos (The Place of Man in the 
Cosmos), which also echoes several other of his later writings. The work starts with a 
digression on the distinction between the nature of man and that of animals; a digression 
which is perhaps not very interesting and remains rather speculative. However, bearing in 
mind that Scheler was often regarded as an inconsistent thinker, it is important to notice how 
this digression in fact reflects Scheler‟s everlasting interest in defining the nature and place of 
man, and that it not only relates to his anthropological, but also, as I shall further demonstrate, 
to his metaphysical and ethical views. 
 
Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos becomes more interesting when Scheler relates the 
distinction he made between two primal principles – a powerless Geist (Spirit) and a powerful 
Trieb (Force) – to the relationship between God and man. According to Scheler, it is not God 
who delivers us from evil, but it is man who has to deliver God from the eternal tension 
between Force and Spirit. Only man – as an acting person (Aktvollziehendes Wesen) – can 
realize a mutual penetration of these two universal attributes and God is the outcome of this 
penetration. God is realized by and through man (Gottwerdung). God is not, until he is set free 
by man. 
“The primal relationship between man and Weltgrund consists in the fact that this 
Weltgrund realizes itself directly in man. The place of this self-realization […] is 
man. The human self and the human heart is the place of God‟s becoming (Ort 
der Gottwerdung).”8 
Scheler explicitly refutes the idea of man as God‟s slave or subject. Man is God‟s Mitbildner, 
His “co-creater” or “co-builder”. That is in short the essence of Scheler‟s metaphysics and 
concept of Gottwerdung. The main bone of contention for Catholic readers was of course the 
idea that God is in Himself incomplete as his existence and fulfilment would have to depend 
on what people do. Johannes Hessen, who wrote a very good introduction to Scheler's 
thought, has nicely expressed the immense gulf between such a concept of God and that of 
traditional theisms. 
“Every kind of God who is Himself incomplete, and yearns for completion and 
salvation, is all too human to be a God. It is the model of Faust in a macrocosmic 
expansion. Such a God is not the God of the real religious consciousness.”9  
b) The origins of the concept of Gottwerdung 
As I have already said, many displeased Catholic critics and readers of Scheler tried to 
explain away Scheler‟s metaphysical swing and his anthropocentric concept of God by a one-
sided “psychologizing” of his philosophy, as if nosing in Scheler‟s private life was the only 
way to understand his thoughts. This tendency is for example very evident in Nota‟s 
interpretation of the powerful Trieb and the powerless Geist in Scheler‟s metaphysics as 
merely a metaphysical reflection of Scheler‟s inability to resist his own sexual urges. Such 
“psychologizing” has no doubt contributed to the general devaluation of Scheler‟s philosophy 
after his death, as the arguments of philosophers whose world views depend on their own 
libido, generally do not seem very convincing.  
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Of course, it does not show much respect for Scheler as a philosopher to claim that he 
changed his metaphysics, in such a fundamental way as he did, due to merely personal (and 
above all sexual) motives. Anyone who takes Scheler seriously as a philosopher, must assume 
that he must have had good philosophical reasons for abandoning traditional theism by 
formulating a panentheistic concept of God. 
 
When Scheler first asked Hessen what he thought of his new concept of God, Hessen uttered 
all sorts of doubts and strongly criticized the concept itself. “However, such consideration 
could not seriously alter Scheler‟s belief in his new convictions, as they were too deeply 
rooted in the depth of his being.”10 A similar idea was also put forth by Peter Spader in his 
very insightful Scheler’s Ethical Personalism. Spader argues that Scheler‟s metaphysical 
change was in fact the logical consequence of his consistency as a moral philosopher. Change 
was the necessary result of Scheler‟s “ethical concerns”. 
 
Although Spader correctly argues that Scheler‟s ethical beliefs caused his metaphysical swing 
towards panentheism, I do not entirely agree with Spader when he claims that is was more 
precisely the problem of evil that caused this swing. Spader argues that Scheler‟s ethical 
system did not allow him to give an answer to the question of why so much evil resides in the 
world, without entirely altering his metaphysical position. 
“This [problem of evil] is, of course, a problem for any theism, but given Scheler‟s 
ethical beliefs in the moral role of the infinite person and the connection between the 
moral values of the person and the realization of high and low nonmoral values, it was 
particularly devastating for Scheler‟s ethics.”11 
Such a statement seems rather bold: Spader says in fact that Scheler‟s ethical system in Der 
Formalismus does not allow for an explanation of the problem of evil, without dramatically 
changing metaphysical positions, as if one could not acknowledge Scheler‟s value theory as a 
Roman Catholic; an assumption that has been rejected by many Catholic readers of Der 
Formalismus. At the time this book inspired several German Catholic theologians, such as 
Tillman (Die Idee der Nachfolge Christi) and Schmidt (Organische Aszeze), and it exerted a 
great influence on Karol Wojtyla.
12
  
 
I agree with Spader that the foundation of Scheler‟s new metaphysics is to be sought in 
Scheler‟s ethics, but disagree that “the problem of evil” can explain Scheler‟s metaphysical 
swing or that it was in any way a substantial cause of its development. Moreover, Scheler 
never dealt with the problem of evil that extensively and never suggested that the problem of 
evil caused his metaphysics to change, as Spader admits.
13
  
c) The Primacy of Ethics 
If one wishes to detect a causal relationship between Scheler‟s ethical beliefs and his 
metaphysical shift, it makes sense to take into account the considerations that are central to 
Scheler‟s ethics. Yet, it is not easy to determine what those considerations exactly are. 
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Scheler‟s oeuvre is a labyrinth of thoughts, in which one can easily get lost, due to the fact 
that he wrote so much, and did not always structure his thoughts thoroughly (although he 
more than once promised to do so). 
 
However, at least three aspects of Scheler‟s ethics seem to hold a prominent place and are 
relevant here: the human person, the human (moral) act and human responsibility. It is fair to 
say that those three themes form the core of his ethical system, not as distinct moral or 
philosophical phenomena, but as three parts of a close-knit unity.  
 
Der Formalismus offers a hierarchical theory of values. Moral values are realized on the back 
of non-moral values. There is, according to Scheler an objective hierarchy of non-moral 
values and moral values are realized whenever one choses to realize a higher non-moral value 
(for example intellectual development) instead of a lower one (for example pleasure). In this 
theory, the importance of man, the human person is enormous: man has to create, so to say, 
the Good. The human person is the locus of morality. The human person, defined by Scheler 
as an acting person, an act-accomplishing being (aktvollziehendes Wesen), occupies a central 
place. The human person is the place where moral values see the light of day. The Good 
occurs when the human person voluntarily chooses to perform these acts which he assumes 
are of a higher (non-moral) order then their (non-moral) alternatives.  
 
Moral values always depend on the human person and are thus explicitly defined as 
Personwerte. Scheler‟s tour de force is that he so defines moral values without slipping back 
into any sort of moral subjectivism. In a study of Karol Wojtyla‟s ethics, Rocco Buttiglione 
very nicely expressed the role of the human person in Scheler‟s thought and its general 
significance in the history of philosophy. 
“The fundamental orientation is toward an ontology of the interior order, at the center 
of which is the person. The manifestation of the person and of the particular character 
of personal existence, within which values reveal themselves, is Scheler‟s great 
discovery.”14 
Scheler formulates an “immanent transcendental” ontology of values, in which transcendence 
is derived from an objective order of values (moral objectivism), and in which immanence 
results from the great stress on the human person (I would use the term “moral subjectivism” 
if that were not so misleading) and the human person as an acting person. The latter gives this 
ethical system and ontology of values an utmost dynamic character. It is, I would like to 
remark, no coincidence that philosophers like Nikolaj Berdjaev, Karol Wojtyla and Vladimir 
Jankélévitch, who were all acquianted with Scheler‟s writings, have formulated a dynamical 
ethical theory in which a similar emphasis on the human person and act can be found. All 
these philosophers formulate an ethical theory in which man is confronted with an enormous 
moral responsibility and autonomy. 
 
Due to the emphasis Scheler puts on the human act in order for morality to exist, this morality 
has an unmistakable dynamic character. The essence of morality lies in its being performed, 
which is why it seems correct to describe Scheler‟s ethical system as a Philosophie der Tat; it 
is an active philosophy which does not neglect the importance of the will (intention), but 
which stresses the importance of “the human act” in the genesis of moral values. The Good is 
not, until it is done. 
                                                 
14
 Rocco Buttiglione, Karol Wojtyla: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II (Michigan: 
Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1997), p. 92. 
It requires both Gesinnung and Handlung, the mere act of willing needs to be connected with 
a concrete willingness and ability to act. A child may be willing that the stars drop from the 
sky into its own hands, Scheler states, but this pure act of willing does not tell us anything 
about the active realization of moral values, which requires an actual willingness and ability 
to perform moral acts (Tunwollen and Tunkönnen). Essential to the moral development and 
elevation of man – to the ontological and axiological existence of moral values – is the acting 
person. “The primary phenomenon, which characterizes all spiritual maturing, is a continuous 
reference of the will to the sphere of acting (die Sphäre des Tunlichen).”15 The moral and 
spiritual nature of man depends on the ability to evolve from a mere act of willing to a 
concrete act of doing good. This is where man can testify to his goodness and virtue, for 
Scheler defines virtue as the tatbereite und tatfähige Gesinnung, again stressing the moral 
meaning of the human person and his agency.
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The dynamical concept of morality, as Scheler himself indicated in the preface to the third 
edition of Der Formalismus, led Scheler to rethink his metaphysics. One could indeed wonder 
to what extent Scheler‟s dynamical concept of morality was compatible with a more 
traditional concept of God as the primary source of moral values and even as the fundamental 
instigator of man‟s moral acts.17 How does a static concept of an almighty God relate to a 
dynamical conception of morality in which the human person is the locus of moral values? 
How does this relate to man‟s moral responsibility and autonomy, and Scheler‟s aversion to 
any sort of moral slavery and suppression? Obviously these questions bothered Scheler much, 
and in Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos he explicitly expressed his rejection of the idea 
of man as God‟s slave or subject. Here we seem to come to the specific point where Scheler 
implicitly acknowledges how his ethics and new metaphysics meet. 
“Man appears in proportion to the structure of society as a slave of God, to whom he 
kneels by means of guile and humble prostration, seeking to move Him by petition and 
threat or with magic means. […] All similar ideas must be rejected in the light of our 
philosophical endeavours relating the relationship between Man and the primal 
Ground of everything. And we have to reject it therefore, because we do not accept the 
theistic presupposition of a spiritual, almighty personal God.”18  
In order fully to affirm his ethical views on man‟s moral responsibility and autonomy, Scheler 
used a different kind of metaphysical framework from those offered by traditional theisms. He 
tried to formulate a metaphysical framework which affirmed his ethical views, and it is 
consequently no coincidence that indeed many of the earlier writings and ethical views can be 
found in the renewing and controversial metaphysics of Scheler‟s Späte Schriften. The 
anthropological quest for the definition and moral value of the human person is, as it had 
always been, the driving force of Scheler‟s thought, and the Schelerian leitmotifs of love, 
knowledge, self-realization, and so on, so central in this quest, are still manifestly at the fore 
after Scheler‟s metaphysical swing. 
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Furthermore, the dynamical character of morality – so central in Scheler‟s ethics and in many 
theories formulated by those who were, to a greater or lesser extent adherents of Scheler‟s 
thought – finds its metaphysical equivalence in the concept of Gottwerdung. Where the 
human person – on the basis of Scheler‟s Der Formalismus – used to be responsible “merely” 
for the realization of the Good, he is now explicitly held responsible for the realization of 
God. “It is thus through the human person that God becomes.”19  
Ever greater stress is thus put on the enormous responsibility and autonomy of man, who is 
responsible not only for the Good, but also for God‟s existence. Scheler‟s thought is always 
insistent and urges us towards the realization of the Good. Scheler‟s philosophical struggle is 
perhaps above all a struggle against nihilism, moral indifference, relativism and passivity, 
which can all be described as forms of moral slavery (for it is only in doing good that man 
achieves and realizes his freedom). His ethics is a struggle against these forms of slavery, and 
it is no surprise that Scheler explicitly dealt with this slavery in Der Formalismus in a chapter 
entitled The Essence of the Moral Person, in which he puts emphasis on the significance of 
the person‟s moral autonomy and responsibility. Slavery is opposed to the core of Scheler‟s 
ethical theory like fire is to water, and lacks precisely those things Scheler calls the essence of 
the moral person: responsibility, autonomy, Tunwollen and Tunkönnen.
20
  
 
Scheler‟s views on the human acting person, his dynamical conception of morality, the 
Schelerian question of why people are actually motivated to do the Good (a question which is 
implicitly present in all his main ideas and concepts), and ultimately his concept of 
Gottwerdung relate to this struggle to preserve man‟s moral autonomy and responsibility. 
Scheler‟s ethics is therefore also a struggle against nihilism and moral inertia. He morally 
rejects man‟s passivity, apathy and inertia, and this is a salient feature of his entire oeuvre: 
from the early writings to the Späte Schriften. It is for example characteristic of Scheler‟s 
theory of resentment and the concept of Ohnmacht, which he defines as the cause of value 
distortions (i.e. resentment), and which he considers to be typified by Fyodor Dostoevsky‟s 
underground man, who is a victim of his own inertia, and whose inertia leads to his moral 
downfall. In his theory of resentment Scheler links a lack of interest, participation and action 
to moral decline, not only the person‟s individual moral decline but even that of society as a 
Gesammtperson (collective person). “Scheler warns of the link between political apathy and 
the rise of despotism.”21  
Since the person‟s agency is indispensible in order for moral values to come into existence, 
inaction itself, which (though not exclusively) can be a consequence of passivity, apathy and 
inertia, is a severe moral problem. Scheler‟s theory of resentment, the value theory elaborated 
in Der Formalismus and eventually the concept of Gottwerdung, all entail an emphasis on the 
moral significance of the human person as an aktvollziehendes Wesen. The concept of 
Gottwerdung as such is in line with and undergirds the entire essence of Scheler‟s ethics. 
Scheler‟s metaphysical swing did not entail an abandonment of the earlier ethical beliefs, but 
on the contrary strongly affirms these beliefs. In a way, one could conclude, that Scheler‟s 
oeuvre proves Levinas‟ right, when he said that the first philosophy is always ethics. 
 
INTERNAL CONSISTENCY OF THE SPÄTE SCHRIFTEN 
a) On Knowledge 
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Having said this, I would like to conclude this article by emphasizing that Scheler‟s Späte 
Schriften are not just a collection of distinct essays. It has been said that Scheler had 
“degenerated” from being a real philosophical system builder (Der Formalismus was a 
voluminous work which did not leave many philosophical disciplines untouched) to a 
philosopher who could not structure his ideas thoroughly and therefore only continued to 
write short essays in which the internal consistency was seriously questioned. 
 
If one were to recognize the internal consistency between these Späte Schriften, one could 
probably come to a better evaluation of them. First of all, it is important to realize how 
Scheler‟s ethics and renewing metaphysics were closely connected to his epistemological 
views. According to Scheler, man is the only living creature capable of opposing its own 
Trieb, which allows him to evolve from Dasein (the existence of things) to Sosein (the 
essence of these things). Simply put: man is capable of evolving from mere existence to the 
true essence of being, owing to the fact that man is the place where Geist and Trieb meet. The 
main function of the human Spirit is Ideierung and this specific act leads to knowledge. 
Scheler gives the example of pain. When man experiences pain, he can direct his Geist 
towards something that surpasses mere reality (the pain itself). He can address certain 
philosophical, metaphysical questions: what is the source of this experience, what is pain, 
what is the source of the world überhaupt, etc.? Why is this world like it is (Sosein)? After 
having experienced reality, man – with his Geist – can evolve towards a deeper insight and a 
higher, ontological form of knowledge.
22
 
 
This theory of knowledge is of the utmost importance in the totality of Scheler‟s image of 
God and man. Furthermore, Nota has correctly noticed that much of this theory of knowledge 
could already be found in the early writings, once more an indication that although Scheler 
rejected any theism in the end, he did not change that much as a philosopher.  
 
The subject that knows has a certain desire to transcend reality, a desire which Scheler more 
than once described as (an act of) love. It is the love to direct one‟s Geist to the essence of 
being (Sosein); the love to resist or surpass Trieb and mere existence. This “love” makes 
knowledge possible, since it generates an orientation towards the substantial. According to 
Scheler, there are three types of knowledge, the first of which is called Herrschaftswissen 
(mastery knowledge). This is the kind of knowledge that allows people to control or structure 
reality: nature, society, history, etc. It is the knowledge of positive sciences, aimed at 
mastering reality by the use of technology and applied sciences. It is a kind of knowledge 
which solely focusses on Dasein.  
A more philosophical kind of knowledge is Bildungswissen (cultural knowledge). This type of 
knowledge allows us to detach ourselves from reality and question the reasons and origins of 
this reality. It allows us to see through the surface of things to their essences (Wesensschau). 
Whereas Herrschaftswissen is aimed at changing reality, Bildungswissen causes the human 
Geist to change and develop. This knowledge leads to Bildung, Humanisierung, 
Menschwerdung, i.e. the moral, cultural and intellectual formation of man as a human person. 
 
The highest form of knowledge is not directed to the development of the human person itself, 
but to the development of God. Erlösungswissen (redemption knowledge) is metaphysical and 
religious knowledge and obviously relates to Scheler‟s concept of Gottwerdung. When man 
reaches this kind of knowledge, he can truly call himself Mitbildner or Mitstifter of God and 
the world process. Such a man is described by Scheler as a Total Man (Allmensch) and fulfils 
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the most beautiful and important of all tasks: the realization of God and the Good through a 
balanced reconciliation of Spirit and Force. Thoughts and acts are unified in harmony and this 
harmony leads to an eternal peace in God.  
 
I would like to add two things here, so that Scheler‟s views will not be mistaken. Firstly,  this 
eternal peace in God must not be understood as a static end point of history, but rather as a 
goal without finality (which is also characteristic for the philosophy of Buber, Jankélévitch, 
Levinas and even for Kant‟s Kingdom of Ends). It is something we ought to strive for and 
keep striving for. We can never come to a point where we can rest on our laurels, 
contemplating our lives and history in a self-congratulatory way. Such an interpretation of this 
eternal peace in God would be completely contradictory to the essence of Scheler‟s ethics, 
which is, as previously stated, characterized by an eternal openness and activity. In his 
brilliant and underestimated essay Ordo amoris (which can be seen as an addendum to Der 
Formalismus), Scheler states that the moral essence is only revealed in the moments we 
perform moral acts. Human love – as the essence of these acts – has always an infinite and 
incomplete character. It is a wesensunendliche Prozess due to the fact that every realization is 
only temporal. When we linger over what is, and fail to see what should be, what is still to 
come and to be done, love does no longer exist (once more one could keep in mind that these 
thoughts can also be found in the works of Jankélévitch). Love, morality, God and eternal 
peace all have an active, dynamic character and need to be fulfilled not once, but over and 
over again. 
 
Secondly, I would like to stress that Scheler‟s epistemology, ethics and metanthropology do 
not lead to any kind of “renewed asceticism”. Due to the fact that Scheler explicitly stated that 
one needs to surpass and transcend reality in order to realize the highest form of knowledge, 
many have interpreted Scheler‟s epistemology as a plea for ascetism and for a denial of life. 
Ron Perrin, for example, wrote that Scheler‟s “conception of the total man concludes in a new 
asceticism,”23 adding that Scheler had evolved from an initial vitalism into an extreme sort of 
intellectualism and spiritualism in which reality is thought away. Scheler‟s references to 
Buddhism have also been understood more than once as indications of this “new asceticism”. 
I do wish to stress that such interpretations seem to neglect the dynamic character of Scheler‟s 
ethics, and I do not see how Scheler‟s persistent emphasis on the human person as an acting 
person, who bears the responsibility to do good, can be compatible with such an asceticism. 
 
To resume, the close relationship between knowledge and morality consists in the fact that 
Scheler elaborated an hierarchy of knowledge which corresponds with an hierarchy of values: 
the highest form of knowledge, metaphysical knowledge, is the knowledge that stimulates 
man towards the fulfilment of the highest and most beautiful of all moral values: 
Gottwerdung, the bringing into being of God. 
 
b) On Politics 
Although Scheler perhaps did not write any voluminous studies during the last years of his 
life, he was still a system builder, whose ethical views related to his metaphysics and 
epistemological views. Scheler‟s epistemological views related to his concept of 
Gottwerdung, but so did his metanthropology and ethics. The same can be said of his political 
views. Scheler expressed these political views in the essay Der Mensch im Weltalter des 
Ausgleichs (Man in an Era of Adjustment). Perrin has correctly stressed that this work, in fact 
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 Ron Perrin, Max Scheler’s Concept of the Person: An Ethics of Humanism (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1991, 
pp. 123-124. 
resumes the problem of Spirit and Force and how they can be unified, by man, in politics and 
society.  
 
There are indeed many characteristics of Scheler‟s ethics and metaphysics which can also be 
found in Scheler‟s political views. First, these views focus entirely on the harmonization of 
opposing principles and attributes. It is a politics of reconciliation, harmony, and mutual 
understanding, and in this mirrors his metaphysics, in which the harmonization of Geist and 
Trieb occupies a central place. Secondly, the problem of personal and co-responsibility has 
once again directly and implicitly come to the fore in his political views, indicating that 
responsibility was not merely a pillar of Scheler‟s ethical theory, but also crucial in Scheler‟s 
views on politics and society. Thirdly, and more importantly, Scheler resumed the idea of a 
Total Man, who has the will, the love, the knowledge, and the motivation to do Good and 
realize God, in Der Mensch im Weltalter des Ausgleichs. His ethical and metaphysical 
conceptions are thus explicitly present in his political views, and ultimately determine his 
political goals and ideals. 
 
Scheler‟s ideal of Ausgleich has unmistakable spiritual, philosophical, as well as social and 
political components, which do depend on one another. Not only do Scheler‟s philosophical 
views determine his political views. These political goals in turn are fundamental in Scheler‟s 
striving towards a cosmopolitan metaphysics. Hence, Scheler‟s political ideal of an Ausgleich 
is absorbed into a wider ethical goal. “That this Adjustment may lead to a rise of personal 
value. This is above all the purpose of all politics.”24 
 
CONCLUSION 
I have thus far tried to argue on the one hand how Scheler‟s metaphysical swing is in fact the 
logical outcome of his earlier ethical views, and on the other hand that Scheler‟s new 
metaphysical position was in harmony with the epistemological and political views he held in 
the last years of his life. I hope that this will not only lead to a better comprehension of 
Scheler‟s entire oeuvre, but also to a re-evaluation of Scheler‟s last writings. Scheler‟s oeuvre 
is a labyrinth of thoughts, in which one can easily get lost. An internal harmony between these 
thoughts and writings is therefore not always easy to find, and has given rise to the popular 
interpretation of Scheler as an inconsistent thinker who changed ideas too readily to be 
associated with any definite group of them. This popular critique seems incorrect and 
certainly unsatisfying when trying to explain the development of Scheler‟s thought.  
 
Scheler was not an inconsistent philosopher. At the most, he was a precipitate philosopher, 
who could have used more time to structure his ideas more clearly. In Scheler‟s thought there 
is a remarkable ethical consistency: love, moral responsibility, the dynamics of morality (by 
which I mean, the realization of moral potentiality in an Aristotelian sense), the combination 
of sociological and phenomenological methods, anthropology and the human person, all 
dominate Scheler‟s thought: from the beginning to the end. The fact that Scheler abandoned 
Catholicism and changed his metaphysical views, is no sign of any inconsistency, but rather 
the proof of his consistency as a moral philosopher, who wished to define the human person 
as the locus of an ever moving and developing morality through the human act (man as an 
Aktvolziehendes Wesen). This dynamic conception of value required, in the end, a dynamic 
concept of God (Gottwerdung) and that is the path that Scheler was bound, in consistency, to 
take. 
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Whether one agrees with Scheler‟s metaphysics or not, the persistent value of Scheler‟s 
thought is his critique of any form of moral slavery. Scheler was a convinced advocate of 
human dignity, autonomy and responsibility. Although his thought has received but little 
attention and seems to interest only a few people, his words have not lost any significance 
over the years and seem of great relevance in an era in which this dignity, autonomy and 
responsibility are curtailed by moral inertia, apathy and passivity. Scheler‟s concept of God 
and his concept of man both invite us to acknowledge that we cannot leave undone what has 
to be done. 
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